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We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering
1998-2006. Our data exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly
associated with firm size, and (iii) lobbying status is highly persistent over time. Estimating a model
of a firm's decision to engage in lobbying, we find significant evidence that up-front costs associated
with entering the political process help explain all three facts. We then exploit a natural experiment
in the expiration in legislation surrounding the H-1B visa cap for high-skilled immigrant workers to
study how these costs affect firms' responses to policy changes. We find that companies primarily
adjusted on the intensive margin: the firms that began to lobby for immigration were those who were
sensitive to H-1B policy changes and who were already advocating for other issues, rather than firms
that became involved in lobbying anew. For a firm already lobbying, the response is determined by
the importance of the issue to the firm's business rather than the scale of the firm's prior lobbying efforts.






















Lobbying is a primary avenue through which ￿rms attempt to change policy in
the United States, with total expenditures outnumbering campaign contribu-
tions by a factor of nine. While lobbying by businesses is a frequently debated
issue in popular discourse, there is little systematic empirical evidence on these
behaviors at the ￿rm level.2 We use a matched data set on ￿rms￿lobbying
expenditures and operations to study the determinants of direct ￿rm lobbying
over time. We ￿nd signi￿cant evidence for the existence of up-front costs that
are associated with beginning to lobby. These costs a⁄ect ￿rms￿decisions of
whether or not to invest in the political process over time and in￿ uence how
they react to changes in the policy environment. Moreover, ￿rms that are al-
ready lobbying show a signi￿cant propensity and ability to adjust their e⁄orts
to maximize pro￿ts. We hope that our ￿ndings will help guide future work in
political economy and stimulate further inquiry into understanding the decisions
of ￿rms to a⁄ect the political process.
Prior empirical work on ￿rm participation in the policy making process is
small, due in many cases to data constraints. Most of the available evidence that
we do have comes from data on campaign contributions. These contributions
often come from Political Action Committees (PACs), which can be set up and
organized by ￿rms but which must raise money from voluntary donations from
individuals.3 These studies have addressed such questions as the correlation
between political activity and ￿rm size as well as the e⁄ect that contributions
have on a ￿rm￿ s stock market price.4 Bombardini (2008) in particular has
developed a model in which up-front costs a⁄ect ￿rms￿decisions of whether or
not to lobby. She uses data on campaign contributions to demonstrate that her
approach ￿ts the data on the industry-level structure of tari⁄s better than prior
models. Grossman and Helpman (2001) also consider a model in which there
are ￿xed costs associated with lobbying. Little work has been done, however,
either empirically or theoretically, in looking at the determinants of ￿rm e⁄orts
in a dynamic context. With the exception of Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra
(2011), the empirical literature on the political economy of international labor
movements is also quite thin.5
2See Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) and Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra
(2011). Recent ￿rm-level exceptions include Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011) and Chen,
Parsley, and Wang (2010).
3Direct political contributions by ￿rms were prohibited by the Tillman Act of 1907. A 2010
decision by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission granted
corporations, unions, and individuals the right to donate unlimited funds to outside groups
to campaign for or against candidates. Our discussion of the legal framework for lobbying
focuses on the 1998-2006 period that we analyze empirically.
4See Grenzke (1989), Grier, Munger, and Roberts (1994), Romer and Snyder (1994),
Hansen and Mitchell (2000), Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010), and Cooper, Gulen, and
Ovtchinnikov (2010). Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), Faccio, McConnell, and Masulis (2006),
Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and Khurana (2006), Jayachandran (2006), and Bertrand, Kramarz,
Schoar, and Thesmar (2011) also study politically connected ￿rms.
5The literature on the political economy of trade, in contrast, is much further developed
2To shed light on these issues, we match data on ￿rms￿lobbying expenditures
with other aspects of their operations. These data exhibit several striking fea-
tures. The ￿rst is that few ￿rms lobby, even in our sample of publicly traded
￿rms￿ only 10% of the ￿rms in our sample engage in lobbying in one or more
years over our sample period of 1998-2006. Lobbying is strongly related to ￿rm
size. This is especially true at the extensive margin of whether or not to lobby
but less so at the intensive margin of how much to spend on lobbying once the
decision has been made to participate in the process. Finally, we ￿nd that lob-
bying status is highly persistent over time. The probability that a ￿rm lobbies
in the current year given that it lobbied in the previous year is 92%.
Given the stability of these facts over time, we consider the idea of whether
they are driven by up-front costs that are associated with beginning to lobby.
Such costs could include: learning the complex laws about lobbying; educating
newly hired lobbyists about the details of the ￿rm￿ s interests, characteristics,
and vulnerabilities; developing a lobbying agenda; researching what potential
allies and opponents are lobbying for; and investigating how best to attempt to
a⁄ect the political process (e.g., in which policy makers to invest).6 To the ex-
tent that lobbying represents a legislative subsidy to sympathetic policy makers
(Deardor⁄ and Hall 2006), politicians may also require such an initial invest-
ment of resources to signal a ￿rm￿ s willingness to support them over time. The
qualitative literature on lobbying has long stressed the importance of establish-
ing continuing relationships with policy makers for the e⁄ectiveness of lobbying
e⁄orts. If the bene￿ts from lobbying then fall disproportionately on large ￿rms,
then only these companies will have the incentive to pay this up-front cost.
To test these ideas, we construct a dynamic empirical model of ￿rm lobbying
behavior. This approach implies a reduced form speci￿cation for the probability
that a given ￿rm lobbies in a particular year. In this model ￿rms have to pay
a one-time sunk cost when they begin to lobby. These costs then create an
option value associated with continuing to lobby that alters ￿rms￿intertemporal
decisions. Once ￿rms get in, they tend to stay in because they would prefer not
to spend the money to set up a lobbying operation again in the near future.
When we take the model to the data, we ￿nd strong evidence for the existence
of these entry costs. Even after accounting for a number of other factors that
would drive ￿rm behavior, we see that these up-front costs exert a signi￿cant
in￿ uence on ￿rm decisions over time.
To further test these predictions, we then look in depth at a speci￿c policy
shift that has been the subject of signi￿cant public debate: the dramatic decline
in the limit on H-1B visas that occurred in 2004. This decline was due to the
expiration of prior legislation and o⁄ers a special natural experiment (e.g., Kato
theoretically and empirically (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994, Goldberg and Maggi 1999,
Mitra 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000, Magee 2002, Bombardini and Trebbi 2011).
6We abstract from the decision to lobby by setting up an in-house lobbying department
or by hiring external consultants. While setting up a whole o¢ ce for in-house operations is
likely more expensive, if a ￿rm employs a lobbyist externally the new hire still has to spend a
signi￿cant amount of time learning the particular needs and characteristics of their new client
and how items currently on the agenda will a⁄ect them speci￿cally.
3and Sparber 2011). We show that this event precipitated a signi￿cant shift in
￿rms￿lobbying behavior. Constructing a smaller panel of ￿rms that are likely
to be responsive to shifts in immigration policy, we ￿nd that changes in the cap
had little e⁄ect on the extensive margin of lobbying. In other words, the decline
in the limit on H-1B visas did not induce new ￿rms to lobby. The decline did,
however, signi￿cantly shift lobbying resources towards high-skilled immigration
issues amongst ￿rms that had lobbied previously for other issues. Moreover, we
show that the manner in which this shift occurs among ￿rms already lobbying
indicates little constraint on adjustments across issues important for ￿rms. We
consider the large shift in the intensive margin relative to that of the extensive
margin as corroborating evidence for the existence of these barriers to entry.
Our paper contributes to the nascent empirical literature on lobbying and
represents one of the ￿rst to study lobbying behavior at the ￿rm level. Our re-
sults argue that the dynamic nature of lobbying status is a feature that should
be included in both future theoretical and empirical work. Selection into lobby-
ing is driven by a number of distinct factors, and studies that fail to address this
issue will ￿nd biased results. This applies to a wide range of topics, from the
impact of lobbying on ￿rm performance to the determinants of trade protection-
ism. More generally, we contribute to understanding the microfoundations of
how political institutions function. Understanding these foundations is crucial
for a number of questions in political economy.7 Entry costs can e⁄ectively "￿x
the players in the game" with respect to the set of ￿rms engaged in the process.
These costs can thus in￿ uence policy choices through altering the composition
of ￿rms that lobby on issues. In particular, the persistence induced by these
costs likely allows ￿rms and politicians to be able to predict what groups will
work to support or oppose various policy changes. Moreover, stability in this
interface between government and ￿rms may induce persistence in political and
economic institutions or raise the prospects of regulatory capture.
In the next section we describe our data and a number of features of these
data that are suggestive of the existence of up-front costs. We then develop our
model of ￿rm behavior and empirical approach in Section 3. We present the
results from our baseline estimations as well as a number of robustness checks
in Section 4. Section 5 considers evidence on these costs from responses to
changes in immigration policy. Section 6 concludes and further discusses some
implications of entry costs to lobbying.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
Our data come from a number of sources. The primary information on ￿rms￿
operations comes from Compustat and serves as the platform upon which we
7For example, Snyder (1990, 1992), Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004), Alesina and Rosen-
thal (1995), and Grossman and Helpman (2001).
4build. Information on industry imports comes from the Center for International
Data at the University of California at Davis (Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott
2002). Information on lobbying behavior is possible due to the Lobbying Dis-
closure Act of 1995, subsequently modi￿ed by the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act of 2007. This act requires individual companies and organiza-
tions to provide a substantial amount of information on their lobbying activities.
Since 1996, intermediaries who lobby on behalf of companies and organizations
have to ￿le semi-annual reports to the Secretary of the Senate￿ s O¢ ce of Public
Records (SOPR). Since 2007, quarterly reports have to be ￿led. These reports
list the name of each client, the total amount of funds that they have received
from each client, and a pre-speci￿ed set of general issues for which they lob-
bied for each client. All ￿rms with in-house lobbying departments are similarly
required to ￿le reports, stating their total lobbying expenditures directed to-
wards in-house lobbying activities or external lobbyists. Legislation requires
the disclosure not only of the dollar amounts actually received/spent but also
of the issues that were lobbied for. Appendix Table A1 shows the list of 76
general issues given to each respondent, at least one of which has to be entered.
For each general issue, the ￿ler is also required to list the speci￿c issues which
were lobbied for during the semi-annual period. Thus, unlike PAC contribu-
tions, lobbying expenditures of companies can be associated empirically with
very speci￿c, targeted policy areas.8
We compile comprehensive data on lobbying behavior from the websites of
the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and the SOPR in Washington D.C.
Appendix Figure A1 shows part of the report ￿led by Microsoft for its lobby-
ing expenditures between January - June 2005. Microsoft lists "immigration"
as a general issue and lists "H-1B visas", "L-1 visas", and "PERM (Program
Electronic Review Management System)" as speci￿c issues under immigration.
Besides immigration, Microsoft also lists eight other issues in this report that
are not shown. Given our interest in studying ￿rms￿responses to changes in
high-skilled immigration policy in Section 5, we went through the speci￿c is-
sues listed in each report under immigration and determined which ￿rms were
lobbying for what. The speci￿c issues that are listed are often bills proposed
in the U.S. House and Senate. For example, H.R. 5744: Securing Knowledge,
Innovation, and Leadership Act of 2006 and S. 1635: L-1 Visa Reform Act
of 2004 are bills that we deemed to be relevant for high-skilled immigration.9
8According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the term "lobbying activities" refers to "lob-
bying contacts and e⁄orts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning
activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed,
for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others." The term "lob-
bying contact" refers instead to "any oral or written communication (including an electronic
communication) to a covered executive branch o¢ cial or a covered legislative branch o¢ cial".
Further, a lobbyist is "any individual (1) who is either employed or retained by a client for
￿nancial or other compensation; (2) whose services include more than one lobbying contact;
and (3) whose lobbying activities constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services during
a three-month period." Any person meeting these criteria must register as a federal lobbyist
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act.
9H.R. 5744, for example, included provisions for increasing the annual H-1B visa cap and
revised student visa provisions. Other bills, such as H.R. 4437: Border Protection, Antiterror-
5In addition to mentioning speci￿c bills, ￿rms also mention "H-1B visas," "L-1
visas," "high-skilled immigration," and the like in their lobbying reports. We
de￿ne a ￿rm to be lobbying for high-skilled immigration in any of these cases.10
For our analysis of ￿rms￿responses to changes in immigration policy, we also
use data on applications for H-1B visas and the ethnic composition of a ￿rm￿ s
workforce. These data are described in Section 5.
One central concern in studying the dynamics of ￿rm lobbying is measure-
ment error in the variable for lobbying status. Under the Lobbying Disclosure
Act, lobbying ￿rms are required to provide a good-faith estimate rounded to
the nearest $20,000 of all lobbying-related income in each six-month period.
Likewise, organizations that hire lobbyists must provide a good-faith estimate
rounded to the nearest $20,000 of all lobbying-related expenditures in a six-
month period. An organization that spends less than $10,000 in any six-month
period does not have to state its expenditures. If lobbying is disclosed in such
cases, the ￿gure is reported in the data as zero. Thus as long as a ￿rm spent
$10,000 or more, lobbying status will be correctly observed. Looking at the
data, average yearly lobbying expenditures for active ￿rms are $475,000. The
mean expenditure for a ￿rm the ￿rst time we observe them lobbying outside of
the start of the sample is $111,000. Median values are $164,000 and $74,000, re-
spectively. These ￿gures indicate that measurement error induced by reporting
requirements is likely to be minimal.
We begin by establishing a number of new facts about the lobbying behavior
of ￿rms over time. We consider a balanced panel of U.S.-headquartered ￿rms
over the period 1998-2006 that have full sales and employment data. This
approach allows us to abstract from the decision to take a company public as
well as entry and exit into production. This results in a sample of 3,260 ￿rms
and 29,340 observations. Table 1 presents a number of descriptive statistics on
this sample for all ￿rms, as well as broken out by ￿rms that lobby and those
that do not. As mentioned above, when we match these data to our Compustat
sample, we ￿nd that very few ￿rms lobby. This is striking, as our data only
contain publicly traded companies. These ￿rms are by and large quite sizable
and thus more likely than private ￿rms to lobby.
We further ￿nd both the intensive and extensive margins of lobbying are
related to ￿rm size. The average ￿rm that lobbies sell roughly four times more
ism, and Immigration Control Act of 2005 and S.2611: Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Act of 2006, are related to immigration but do not include provisions directly related to high-
skilled immigration. Bills pertaining to high-skilled immigration are detailed in the Data
Appendix available from the authors. One important piece of legislation is H.R. 4818: Con-
solidated Appropriations Act, which in 2005 exempted up to 20,000 foreign nationals holding
a master￿ s or higher degree from the cap on H-1B visas. The bill was signed into law in
December, 2004.
10Lobbying data consist of semi-annual lobbying disclosure reports and are posted online.
Annual lobbying expenditures are calculated by adding mid-year totals and year-end totals.
Whenever there is a discrepancy between data on income and expenditures, CRP uses infor-
mation from lobbying reports on expenditure. With both the lobbying data and the patenting
data described later, we invested substantial e⁄ort in identifying subsidiaries and appropri-
ately linking them to parent ￿rms. Data in Compustat are based on each company￿ s ￿scal
year. As discussed below, we lag Compustat data by one year when merging.
6than ￿rms that do not lobby. Employment and assets are similarly three-and-
a-half times and two times larger, respectively. While ￿rms that lobby are only
slightly more likely to engage in research and development (R&D), they tend
to spend a signi￿cantly larger amount on R&D if they do engage in it. These
results are consistent with the literature on campaign contributions, re￿ ecting
the correlation between lobbying e⁄orts and PAC contributions.11 Amongst
￿rms that do lobby, there is a correlation of 28% between sales and lobbying
expenditures and 19% between employment and lobbying expenditures. The
somewhat weaker correlation between ￿rm size and lobbying on the intensive
margin relative to that on the extensive margin is suggestive of the existence
of barriers to entry. Indeed, if no such barriers existed, we would expect a
signi￿cantly stronger correlation between ￿rm size and lobbying expenditures
on the intensive margin.
A particularly striking feature of the data is the high degree of persistence
of ￿rm lobbying behavior over time. Given that a ￿rm lobbied last year, the
unconditional likelihood of lobbying in the current year is 92%. When we look
at this ￿gure across industries, we ￿nd very similar results, with almost all
two-digit NAICS industries having a persistence rate above 80%.12 Considering
changes over time, entry and exit appear partly driven by the bi-yearly election
cycle. Interestingly, entry seems to happen in the year before an election, rather
than in the year of the election itself. These results suggest that ￿rms may need
to invest early in certain political outcomes. Patterns of exit, in contrast, seem
to be unrelated to the election cycle.
Figure 1 plots the number of total ￿rms lobbying as well as the total num-
ber of entries and exits in each year of our sample. Entries and exits are small
relative to the overall number of ￿rms lobbying, re￿ ecting the high level of per-
sistence amongst ￿rms. The total number of ￿rms that lobby in our sample
increases steadily over time, with entries in each year regularly outnumbering
exits. This pattern is consistent with the ￿ndings of Blanes i Vidal, Dracaz,
and Fons-Rosen (2011), who document that total lobbying expenditures were
roughly twice as large in 2006 as they were in 1998. The two facts that (i) lobby-
ing status is highly persistent over time and (ii) lobbying is strongly associated
with ￿rm size mean that the intensive margin of lobbying dominates annual
changes in lobbying expenditures. Thus, in a typical year 96% of expenditures
were made by ￿rms that lobbied in the previous year. Figure 2 plots the total
amount of lobbying expenditures based on which year ￿rms ￿rst began lobbying
in the sample. The vast majority of resources spent over time are accounted for
by ￿rms that were lobbying at the beginning of the sample, and this remains
true even by the end of our sample eight years later. Firms that entered and
￿rst lobbied in 1999, for example, account for a small amount of expenditures,
even after several years.
11See Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder (2002), Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011), and
Ludema, Mayda, and Mishra (2010).
12Igan and Mishra (2011) also ￿nd evidence of persistence in lobbying behavior in the case
of ￿nancial industry lobbyists.
73 Model and Estimation Strategy
To test for the existence of up-front costs associated with beginning to lobby
directly, we consider a dynamic model of ￿rm behavior. Our approach is akin
to the models used in the literature on international trade, particularly that of
Roberts and Tybout (1997).13 The essential logic of the model is that if there
are no up-front costs to beginning to lobby, one should expect ￿rms to start and
stop lobbying freely. That is, they should optimize based on today￿ s problem
and not worry about the future. If there are such costs, however, then there
is an option value associated with being involved in the political process that
should alter ￿rms￿inter-temporal decisions.
We begin by de￿ning ￿it (pt;sit) as the additional pro￿ts that ￿rm i could
make in year t if it lobbies. This level is dependent on exogenous processes
pt, such as the business cycle and political climate, and ￿rm-level state vari-
ables sit, such as the capital stock. In de￿ning ￿it (pt;sit) as the additional
pro￿t that a ￿rm could make in period t if it lobbied relative to the state in
which it did not lobby, the model is able to accommodate the fact that the
￿rm has other avenues through which it can a⁄ect policy outcomes. We assume
that once they begin, lobbying ￿rms can alter the amount that they spend
costlessly, making ￿it the pro￿t-maximizing level of additional pro￿ts.14 We
further de￿ne Lit as an indicator variable for whether the ￿rm lobbies in year
t. L
(￿)
it = fLit j j = 0;1;2;:::;Jig denotes the ￿rm￿ s lobbying history where
Ji is the ￿rm￿ s age and L
(+)
it = fLi;t+j j j ￿ 0g represents the ￿rm￿ s choice of
lobbying activities in the future. The ￿rst time that ￿rms lobby, they have to
pay a one-time cost F0. Similarly, if the ￿rm stopped lobbying j periods ago
and now wants to lobby it has to pay the re-entry cost Fj.15
In order to account for the possibility that re-entering the process after
only a few years of not lobbying is less (or more) costly than entering anew,
we de￿ne the re-entry cost Fj as the expenditure a ￿rm needs to incur if it





k=1 (1 ￿ Li;t￿k)
￿
as an indicator for whether the ￿rm last
lobbied j periods ago. Using this expression, we can then write the net period









￿it (pt;sit) ￿ F0 (1 ￿ Li;t￿1) ￿
XJi
j=2
(Fj ￿ F0) ~ Li;t￿j
￿
:
13See also Dixit (1989), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Das,
Roberts, and Tybout (2007), and Lincoln and McCallum (2011).
14We abstract from the precise mechanisms through which lobbying can increase ￿rm pro￿ts.
For empirical evidence on lobbying and pro￿ts at the ￿rm level, see Chen, Parsley, and Yang
(2010) and Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2011).
15The model can easily be extended to include a cost of exiting. The coe¢ cients on lagged
lobbying status, ￿ below, would then also be a function of these costs.
8Given this expression, we can write the ￿rm￿ s dynamic problem. It selects
the sequence L
(+)
it that maximizes the expected present value of payo⁄s today
subject to the discount rate ￿. Thus the ￿rm chooses













In a dynamic programming context, we can thus write the ￿rm￿ s choice of
whether or not to lobby today Lit as the value that meets the following condition
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where Et (￿) is the expected future value in period t conditional on the infor-






from above and comparing
the di⁄erence in the net bene￿ts between choosing Lit = 1 versus Lit = 0, the
￿rm will lobby in the current period if
￿it (pt;sit)+￿ [Et (Vi;t+1 (￿i;t+1) j Lit = 1) ￿ Et (Vi;t+1 (￿i;t+1) j Lit = 0)] ￿ (1)
F0 ￿ F0 ￿ Lit￿1 +
XJi
j=2 (Fj ￿ F0) ~ Li;t￿j:
Here the term ￿ [Et (Vi;t+1 j Lit = 1) ￿ Et (Vi;t+1 j Lit = 0)] represents the op-
tion value associated with being able to lobby tomorrow without having to pay
the up-front entry cost, which is dependent on expectations about future ben-
e￿ts. We can use the expression in (1) to derive an estimating equation to test
for the existence of up-front costs that are associated with beginning to lobby.
In order to simplify notation, we ￿rst de￿ne
￿￿
it ￿ ￿it (pt;sit)+￿ [Et (Vi;t+1 (￿i;t+1) j Lit = 1) ￿ Et (Vi;t+1 (￿i;t+1) j Lit = 0)]:
This provides an expression for the expected bene￿ts that the ￿rm plans to





it ￿ F0 + F0 ￿ Lit￿1 +
PJi
j=2 (F0 ￿ Fj) ~ Li;t￿j ￿ 0
0 otherwise
This expression collapses if there are no entry or exit costs, and the ￿rm lobbies
if ￿it (pt;sit) ￿ 0. That is, the ￿rm decides to lobby solely based on what is
most pro￿table today. If the factors that determine ￿it are properly accounted
for, we should observe an absence of state dependence in lobbying status.
To proceed with estimation, we need to develop an estimate of ￿￿
it￿F0. These
terms are likely determined by a number of factors, including ￿rm characteristics
such as ￿rm size and industry status as well as external time-varying factors such
as the election cycle. We thus parameterize ￿￿
it ￿ F0 with the functional form
￿￿
it ￿ F0 ￿ ￿i + X0
it￿ + ￿t + "it:
9The ￿i term controls for unobserved time-invariant characteristics that induce
persistence in lobbying. These e⁄ects will account for a signi￿cant amount of
the variation in ￿rms￿industry choices and geographic locations. ￿t similarly
controls for year e⁄ects, such as the business cycle and changes in the overall
political environment. The term X0
it￿ accounts for shifts in ￿rm characteristics,
including the logarithms of sales, assets, employees, research and development
expenditures, and the level of industry imports. These variables will allow us to
account for changes in ￿rm size and issues related to intellectual property rights.
We lag these variables by one period to avoid issues of simultaneity. It is worth
noting that the variables in ￿i + X0
it￿ + ￿t + "it will a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s choice to
lobby based both on how they in￿ uence the current level of pro￿ts as well as the
option value associated with having already established a presence in the policy
making process. Thus, even if lobbying may not yield signi￿cant returns today,
it may be wise to begin lobbying as an investment in future political outcomes.
This approximation then leads to the estimating equation
Lit = ￿i + X0
it￿ + ￿ ￿ Lit￿1 + ￿2 ￿ ~ Li;t￿2 + ￿3 ￿ ~ Li;t￿3 + ￿t + "it, (2)
where ￿ = F0 and ￿j = F0 ￿ Fj. Here we assume that re-entry costs are
substantively di⁄erent than F0 for only three years. Our primary object of
interest is the coe¢ cient ￿. If ￿ is estimated to be substantially di⁄erent than
zero, our results would suggest that the up-front costs of beginning to lobby are
empirically relevant for determining ￿rms￿lobbying decisions over time.
4 Model Estimation Results
Table 2 presents results from estimating the speci￿cation in (2) with several ap-
proaches. The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator for whether
￿rm i lobbied in year t. As a ￿rst pass, column (1) presents simple correlation
results for the ￿rm characteristics most closely associated with lobbying status.
The regression includes controls for three-digit NAICS industry, state, and year
￿xed e⁄ects. State and industry ￿xed e⁄ects correspond to the primary one for
the ￿rm, although operations may exist elsewhere. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the ￿rm in all speci￿cations. Consistent with our results in Table
1, we ￿nd statistically signi￿cant evidence of an association between lobbying
status and sales, employment, and research and development expenditures. The
level of industry imports, measured at the four-digit level, demonstrate a posi-
tive relationship but are not statistically signi￿cant.16
16We exclude large conglomerate ￿rms in Compustat in our baseline speci￿cation due to the
di¢ culty of assigning them to particular industries. Our results are robust to their inclusion
by de￿ning these ￿rms as constituting their own industry. Similar to other studies, we code
a minimal value of R&D expenditures for those observations with missing or zero values. We
￿nd comparable results when excluding this covariate from the estimations.
10Our main estimations are found in columns (2)-(8). We use the dynamic
panel data estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) in columns (2)-(6) and con-
sider an OLS ￿xed e⁄ects estimator in columns (7)-(8).17 In each of our speci￿-
cations, we ￿nd evidence in favor of the existence of up-front costs to beginning
to lobby. The coe¢ cients on lagged lobbying status are economically important
and statistically signi￿cant. Controlling for other factors, lobbying in the prior
period raises the probability that a ￿rm lobbies in the current period by 88%.
The coe¢ cients are also similar across speci￿cations, suggesting that our ap-
proach is robust. Our baseline speci￿cation is found in column (2). Interestingly,
￿rm sales are still a statistically signi￿cant predictor of ￿rm lobbying status even
after controlling for past lobbying status, albeit with a smaller magnitude. In
column (3) we include additional controls for prior lobbying status, ￿nding that
the costs of re-entering and beginning to lobby again are fairly similar to the
costs of entering anew. Column (4) alternatively drops the ￿rm-speci￿c controls
X0
it￿ in equation (2). The results in both columns yield comparable results to
the baseline approach in column (2).
One concern with the approach that we have taken in columns (2)-(4) is
whether the speci￿cation fully accounts for free-rider behavior in lobbying.
Speci￿cally, separately including ￿rm and time ￿xed e⁄ects in our parameteri-
zation may miss changes in industry dynamics over time. In columns (5) and
(6), we test the robustness of our approach to these concerns. Column (5) re-
ports estimations that include a measure of total lobbying expenditures by other
public companies in ￿rm i0s three-digit NAICS industry. We include a lagged
measure of other-￿rm industry lobbying, and the results are similar when us-
ing a current measure. In column (6) we include interacted industry-year ￿xed
e⁄ects at the two-digit NAICS industry classi￿cation level. This will allow us
to capture di⁄erences in time e⁄ects across industries. In both speci￿cations,
we ￿nd similar results for the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status. Including
both the measure of other-￿rm industry lobbying and industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects
also yields similar results. As an additional robustness check, we found little
change in the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status when controlling for a ￿rm￿ s
within-industry rank in terms of sales or employment over time. This rank is
calculated at the two-digit NAICS level. Dropping ￿rms in industries that were
the most lobbying-intensive or concentrated in terms of sales also yielded similar
results.
To get an alternative perspective on these results, we also estimate equation
(2) with a within ￿xed e⁄ects estimator. This approach is attractive in that
it dispenses with some of the assumptions inherent in using the estimator of
Blundell and Bond (1998).18 Given the length of the panel (T = 9), however,
we expect the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status to be biased downward due
17We use lags of order two as instruments. As a check on the validity of the GMM approach,
we considered the speci￿cation test suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). These tests fail
to suggest any problems with this approach. Roodman (2006) reviews dynamic panel data
models at length.
18Bernard and Jensen (2004) discuss the econometric challenges associated with estimating
a similar speci￿cation in the context of identifying the determinants of export status.
11to the problems raised by Nickell (1981). The results are reported in columns
(7) and (8). The ￿rst approach considers lagged lobbying status whereas the
second includes additional controls for prior lobbying status. While giving a
smaller coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status, both speci￿cations still ￿nd statis-
tically signi￿cant evidence in favor of the existence of up-front costs associated
with beginning to lobby. We also ￿nd statistically signi￿cant results with the
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), although these results are more sensitive
across variants. Appendix Table 3 reports the results from a number of these
robustness checks.
5 Evidence From Immigration Policy
To get a better sense of the nature of these entry costs and how they a⁄ect
the dynamics of ￿rm lobbying behavior, we next study lobbying related to a
particular change in U.S. legislation: the expiration of the expansion of the cap
for H-1B temporary work visas that occurred in 2004. Looking at how ￿rms
respond to policy shifts o⁄ers us another window on the question of whether
or not there are barriers to entry for ￿rms that wish to lobby. Indeed if these
barriers are su¢ ciently large, the entry costs should discourage ￿rms from be-
ginning to lobby in response to changes in the policy environment. Given the
lack of work on the political economy of immigration at the ￿rm level, we begin
by describing the policy change in detail and documenting stylized facts about
lobbying for immigration for the ￿rms in our sample. We then proceed with
our main analyses of how ￿rms responded to these policy changes and how our
￿ndings corroborate our conclusions from the estimations of the model.
The H-1B is the primary visa that governs temporary high-skilled immigra-
tion to the United States for work in science and engineering. Immigrant workers
are an important source of science and engineering talent for the United States;
in the 2000 Census, immigrants accounted for 24% and 47% of all scientists and
engineers with bachelors and doctorate educations, respectively. Immigrant sci-
entists and engineers also accounted for more than half of the net increase in the
U.S. science and engineering labor force since 1995 in the Current Population
Survey (CPS). Many U.S. ￿rms are very dependent upon immigrants for their
science and engineering workers.19
Since the Immigration Act of 1990 established the program, there has been
a limit to the number of H-1B visas that can be issued per year. While other
19Related papers include Lowell and Christian (2000), Lowell (2000, 2001), Stephan and
Levin (2001), Matlo⁄(2003), Zavodny (2003), Kirkegaard (2005), Miano (2005), Borjas (2006),
Rosenzweig (2006), Chellaraj, Maskus, and Mattoo (2008), Hanson (2009), Hanson, Scheve,
and Slaughter (2009),Tambe and Hitt (2009), Mithas and Lucas (2010), Hunt and Gauthier-
Loiselle (2010), Kerr and Lincoln (2010), Kato and Sparber (2011), Hunt (2011), Foley and
Kerr (2011), Peri (2011), and Borjas and Doran (2011). Freeman (1971) and Ryoo and Rosen
(2004) provide classic discussions of the science and engineering labor market.
12aspects of the program have remained relatively stable, this cap has changed
substantially. The cap has also been the subject of signi￿cant public debate
and lobbying e⁄orts. Over the period 1995-2006, there were more than 3,000
news articles about the visa cap. Bill Gates and other prominent industry exec-
utives have repeatedly testi￿ed before Congress in favor of the cap￿ s expansion,
while domestic groups opposed to H-1B workers have lobbied strongly against
it. Executives of high-tech ￿rms often argue that higher H-1B admissions are
necessary to keep U.S. businesses competitive, to spur innovation and growth,
and to keep ￿rms from shifting their operations abroad. Detractors, on the
other hand, argue that the program displaces American workers, lowers wages,
and discourages on-the-job training.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the numerical limit on H-1B visa issuances
over time. The cap was initially set at 65,000 visas until legislation in 1998
and 2000 signi￿cantly expanded the program to 195,000 visas.20 These changes
expired in 2004, and the cap fell back to 65,000 visas. This limit has been
binding since, despite being raised by 20,000 in 2006 through an "advanced
degree" exemption. Figure 4 similarly plots the number of months that it took
to reach the cap in each year. Following Congressional pressure and an audit
by the ￿rm KPMG, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) started
announcing in 2000 when the cap for ￿scal year had been reached. Coinciding
with the downturn in high-technology sectors in the early 2000s, the cap took
12 months to reach in 2001 and was not reached at all in 2002 and 2003. This
changed abruptly, however, in 2004 when the limit fell back to 65,000 visas.
We use the 2004 change in visa allocations to analyze how ￿rms sensitive
to the H-1B program adjusted their lobbying behavior at the intensive versus
extensive margins. The 2004 change is an attractive laboratory for several
reasons. Most important, the expiration o⁄ers a natural experiment to study
the determinants of lobbying behavior. One of the challenges in the empirical
work on lobbying has been to establish a causal link between lobbying behavior
and policy changes (e.g., Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011; Igan, Mishra, and
Tressel 2011). Our empirical strategy allows us to better isolate a causal link
between changes in policy environments and lobbying behavior. The expiration
of legislation also isolates changes in policy enviroments in exogenous ways that
are often not possible with the enactment of legislation (e.g., Romer and Romer
2010). In our context, the date of the expiration was set several years before
(when the cap was raised), and the issue was not central to ￿rms during the
three preceding years due to full or excess visa supply. When the cap returned
to the lower limit, ￿rms had strong reason to believe that lobbying on the H-1B
issue could in￿ uence policy choices. Firm lobbying was an important factor in
20These two expansions were contained in the American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 1998 and the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century
Act of 2000. See Reksulak et al. (2006) and Public Law 105-777, Division C, American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Law, Section 416(c)(2). The cap is only for
new H-1B issuances; applications for renewals for another three years are exempt from this
limit. Universities, government research laboratories, and certain nonpro￿t organizations were
exempted from this cap in 2001.
13the increases in the cap level enacted in 1998 and 2000.21
Finally, studying this policy experiment o⁄ers the advantage that we are able
to measure ￿rm sensitivity to high-skilled immigration issues in a precise way
that is di¢ cult for many issues. As we discuss next, we use information from
each ￿rm￿ s Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) and the ethnic composition
of its science and engineering workforce for these measures. These specialized
dependencies allow for falsi￿cation tests and extensions that may not be feasible
for lobbying related to issues where the main determinant is simply ￿rm size.
Our expectation is that we should see a signi￿cant shift in the intensive margin
towards lobbying for high-skilled immigration but little response in the extensive
margin if up-front costs for lobbying pose a large enough barrier to entry.
Our ￿rst metric of dependency is based upon LCAs. To hire a foreign worker
under the H-1B program, an employer must ￿rst submit an LCA to the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL). The LCA lists a speci￿c person the ￿rm wishes
to hire, and the primary purpose of the LCA is to demonstrate that the worker
in question will be employed in accordance with U.S. law. The second step in
the application process after the LCA is approved is to ￿le a petition with the
USCIS, which makes the ultimate determination about the visa application.22
While data on the H-1B visa issuances are not available, the DOL releases
micro-records on all applications it receives, numbering 1.8 million for 2001-
2006. These records include ￿rm names, and we match the ￿rm names on LCA
records to the ￿rms in our Compustat database. This provides us a measure of
￿rms￿demand for H-1B visas, independent of whether or not a visa is actually
granted. Firms seeking a large number of H-1B visas are likely to be very
sensitive to the downward adjustment of the cap and have reason to lobby for
its expansion.23
Our second metric uses information on the ethnic composition of ￿rms￿sci-
ence and engineering employees. Firms that employ many immigrant scientists
and engineers are likely to be very sensitive to the H-1B program. To esti-
mate this dependency, we obtained data on each ￿rm￿ s patents and inventors
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO). While we are unable
to directly discern immigrant status for inventors, we can discern the proba-
ble ethnicities of inventors through their names. The basic approach uses the
21Adjustments to the H-1B cap a⁄ect ￿rms in important ways, and this impact is likely
to be similar in magnitude to many other lobbying e⁄orts (i.e., the issue is important to the
￿rm but the complete fate of the ￿rm does not rest solely on this policy choice). Back-of-the-
envelope calculations using the CPS suggest that raising the H-1B cap by 65,000 visas would
increase the U.S. science and engineering labor force by about 1.2%, holding everything else
constant. This increase would be about half of the median annual growth rate of science and
engineering workers, calculated at 2.7% during the period. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) analyze
how H-1B population levels a⁄ect dependent ￿rms￿invention rates.
22Di⁄erent employers can simultaneously seek visas for the same prospective employee,
although ￿rms generally make applications only on behalf of committed workers due to the
time and legal fees involved. The application fee for a ￿rm with 26 or more full-time employees
was $2,320 in 2008.
23LCAs can list more than one potential immigrant employee; the average across our sample
is 2.5 employees per LCA record. Our reported results use LCA record counts; we ￿nd very
similar elasticities and precision when using employee-weighted record counts.
14fact that inventors with the surnames Chang or Wang are more likely to be
of Chinese ethnicity than of Hispanic ethnicity, while the opposite is true for
Martinez and Rodriguez. We use two commercial ethnic databases that were
originally developed for marketing purposes, and the name matching algorithms
have been extensively customized for the USPTO data. The match rate is 99%
and is veri￿ed through several quality assurance exercises.24 The H-1B program
draws primarily from India and China, which account for over half of all visas
during our sample period, and the great majority of those related to science and
engineering. Firms that employ a large number of Chinese and Indian scientists
and engineers are again likely to be very sensitive to the cap￿ s level.
We develop a panel data set of 171 major ￿rms over 2001-2006 for whom
we can construct these measures of dependency on the H-1B visa. This period
presents an interesting time to study lobbying behavior, as the main identifying
variation during the period corresponds to the expiration of the expansion of
the H-1B cap expansion in 2004. The time frame is also partially dictated by
the availability of LCA and lobbying data.
Our sample construction requires that each ￿rm appears in the Compustat
database in all six years, is headquartered in the United States, and that it
accounts for at least 0.05% of total U.S. domestic patents. Re￿ ecting the ex-
treme skewness of the ￿rm size distribution, this group of 171 ￿rms accounts
for more than $3 trillion of worldwide production annually despite the modest
size of our sample. Gabaix (2010) notes the particular in￿ uence of very large
￿rms on aggregate economic outcomes, and our work continues in this vein to
describe their e⁄orts to shape the political process. Table 3 presents a number
of descriptive statistics on these ￿rms. These ￿rms are signi￿cantly larger and
more likely to lobby overall than our initial sample described in Table 1. About
70% of these ￿rms lobby in at least one year over the period 2001-2006, and 20%
lobby for immigration. Re￿ ecting the greater share of high-tech ￿rms in this
sample, roughly three-quarters of ￿rms that lobby for immigration speci￿cally
lobby for high-skill immigration. On average 18% of ￿rms￿patents are devel-
oped by inventors of Indian and Chinese ethnicity, and the typical ￿rm ￿les for
94 LCA applications annually.25
We begin our analysis in Table 4. These estimations present simple regres-
sion evidence documenting that ￿rms that are more dependent on high-skilled
immigration tend to lobby more on this topic. The results are similar when
we consider a more generic indicator for lobbying for any immigration-related
issue, re￿ ecting the fact that the majority of the ￿rms in our sample that lobby
for immigration list high-skilled immigration in the speci￿c issues sections of
their reports. The speci￿c links to our two measures of dependency, however,
are sharper for lobbying speci￿c to high-skilled immigration. As a falsi￿cation
exercise, there are no signi￿cant associations between LCA applications or Chi-
24This methodology is further explained in Kerr (2007, 2008) and Kerr and Lincoln (2010).
Kerr and Lincoln (2010) also describe the LCA data in further detail.
25Our core estimations have 846 observations, which is a slight decline from a maximum
sample size of 855 observations from crossing 171 ￿rms and ￿ve years (once lagging is intro-
duced); the dropped observations are due to missing covariates.
15nese and Indian patenting and lobbying for non-immigration related issues like
Clean Air and Water, Consumer Product Safety, or Retirement.
Figure 5 illustrates how ￿rms responded to the cap expiration. We ￿nd
suggestive evidence that lobbying e⁄orts for high-skilled immigration issues in-
tensi￿ed once the H-1B cap was reduced in 2004 and became binding again
for the private sector. Figure 5 plots the fraction of ￿rms lobbying for high-
skilled immigration and the ratio of new H-1B issuances to the cap. These two
measures track each other closely, with the fraction of ￿rms lobbying for im-
migration issues doubling from 6% to 12% between 2003 and 2004. Our data
further suggest that these adjustments were signi￿cantly larger by ￿rms that
were already lobbying. Although only half of the ￿rms that lobbied for high-
skilled immigration in 2004 previously lobbied for the issue in 2003, all of them
had lobbied for at least one issue in the prior year. Indeed, there is no ￿rm-year
observation in which the ￿rm lobbied for high-skilled immigration and did not
lobby in the prior year for some other issue. All of the adjustments among these
major patenting ￿rms in response to the policy change were intensive margin
adjustments, indicative of substantial barriers to entry in lobbying that we found
evidence of in the larger Compustat sample.
Table 5 provides regression evidence on ￿rms￿ responses to these policy
changes using the speci￿cation
Lit = ￿i + X0
it￿ + ￿ ￿ lnHSi;t0 ￿ CapBindst + ￿t + "it. (3)
This approach quanti￿es how ￿rms adjusted their lobbying e⁄orts after the large
decline in available visas in 2004, and in particular how this adjustment depends
on a ￿rm￿ s dependence on high-skilled immigrants. Lit is an indicator function
for whether ￿rm i lobbied in year t, Xit is a set of ￿rm-level characteristics,
HSi;t0 represents a ￿rm￿ s initial dependence on high-skilled immigration, and
CapBindst equals one for the years 2004-2006 and is zero otherwise. The co-
variates in Xit include the logarithms of ￿rm sales, R&D expenditures, and
industry level imports as well as types of technologies patented by the ￿rm and
the geographic region of the patented technologies. We lag each of these charac-
teristics by one year to avoid issues of simultaneity, and we ￿nd similar results
using contemporaneous values or excluding the controls entirely. ￿i denotes a
vector of ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects which controls for unobservable ￿rm-speci￿c charac-
teristics that do not vary over time. ￿t accounts for global shocks that a⁄ect all
the ￿rms equally across di⁄erent time periods.
The HSi;t0 dependencies can be high, exceeding the shares in the general
population. As an example, over 30% of Intel￿ s U.S. patents during this period
come from Chinese and Indian workers. We measure our dependencies using
2001 data only so that they are predetermined, initial values at the start of
the sample period. The log transformation ensures that outliers in dependency
do not overly in￿ uence our results. The ￿rm and year ￿xed e⁄ects control for
the main e⁄ects of the interaction lnHSi;t0 ￿ CapBindst. Standard errors are
clustered at the cross-sectional level of the ￿rm.
Table 5 reports estimations of equation (3) for indicators of high-skilled
immigration lobbying and lobbying overall. We ￿nd strong evidence of a shift
16in 2004 in lobbying for immigration. Reported results focus on lobbying for
high-skilled immigration, and results are similar for overall immigration. Firms
with a higher number of LCA applications and greater ethnic patenting by
Chinese and Indian inventors in 2001 lobbied more intensively for high-skilled
immigration-related issues when the H-1B cap became binding in 2004-2006. A
￿rm with a 10% higher dependence on foreign-born workers is 0.3%-0.4% more
likely to lobby for immigration issues during years 2004-2006. At the same time,
when we consider overall lobbying status as the dependent variable we ￿nd no
evidence of extensive margin adjustments to these policy changes. This pattern
suggests that the increased lobbying for high-skilled immigration came from
￿rms who were already lobbying adjusting the issues over which they lobbied.
We interpret these shifts in lobbying behavior towards high-skilled immigration
issues as evidence for adjustments along the intensive margin, which we further
investigate below.
This response is precisely measured. Moreover, the di⁄erence in coe¢ cient
magnitude between columns (1) and (2) is to be expected, as the LCA metric
represents actual demand for H-1B visas while the ethnic patenting measure
is more of a general determinant of visa demand. The former measure will be
somewhat sharper as visas are used for other occupations like accountants and
consultants, too. Reassuringly, these measured e⁄ects are also extremely local-
ized to immigration lobbying. Unreported estimations repeat the regressions in
columns (1) and (2) for other lobbying issues. Among the twenty top issues
on which ￿rms lobby, the only other issue with an economically or statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cient when using the LCA dependency is Science/Technology,
which is understandable given its link to the H-1B program. Only two issues
are linked to the ethnic patenting measure: Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection
with a positive elasticity and Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities with
a negative elasticity. These cases appear spurious. Overall, this is a very local-
ized response given that these twenty top issues include lobbying on other labor
issues (e.g., unions), patent policy, and trade.
Table 6 further explores ￿rms￿intensive-margin adjustments. We restrict
the sample to those ￿rms which lobbied for at least one issue in every year.
The results shown in columns (1) and (2) are very similar to those in Table
5. This con￿rms that new ￿rms did not enter into lobbying in response to the
policy change. We instead ￿nd that all of the response comes from existing
￿rms who have already undertaken the set-up costs (e.g. establishing an in-
house lobbying department, establishing contacts with legislators) commencing
lobbying for high-skilled immigration issues. These results are consistent with
our ￿ndings in Section 4.
Columns (3) and (4) take this test one step further. The model makes the
prediction that if a ￿rm is already lobbying, it adjusts the amount and direction
of the lobbying it conducts freely and in a pro￿t-optimizing manner. This would
suggest that once a ￿rm is lobbying, it should shift to lobbying for high-skilled
immigration if it is important to the ￿rm independent of the overall size of the
￿rm￿ s lobbying e⁄orts. Some ￿rms like General Electric and Microsoft lobby the
government on many issues. Over the 2001-2006 period, more than 70 ￿rms in
17our sample lobbied on at least ten issues in one year, and 11 ￿rms lobbied on 25
or more issues at once. It follows from our model in Section 3 that the elasticity
of response among lobbying ￿rms should depend only on the importance of
the H-1B issue, and not on the scale of overall lobbying activity. A ￿rm only
lobbying on a few issues should adjust as much as a similarly dependent ￿rm
lobbying on many issues.
We test this prediction in columns (3) and (4) among the ￿rms that always
lobby. We create an indicator variable for a ￿rm being above or below the
median 2001 lobbying expenditures for this group of ￿rms that always lobbies.
We then interact our core regressors with this indicator variable. The main
e⁄ects now quantify the response evident among ￿rms that always lobby but
conduct smaller amounts of lobbying than their peers. The interaction quanti￿es
the di⁄erential e⁄ect for ￿rms that conduct the greatest lobbying e⁄orts. At the
bottom of the table, we provide the linear combination of these two coe¢ cients,
which represents the total elasticity for the upper half of the sample. In the LCA
case, the elasticity declines slightly in the upper half, while the elasticity rises
slightly in the ethnic patenting case. Both di⁄erences, however, are extremely
small and have t-statistics less than 0.5. The same pattern is again evident when
using broader lobbying related to immigration. These ￿ndings strongly suggest
that the choice to lobby on an issue, once lobbying, depends on the importance
of the issue and not the overall scale of lobbying being undertaken by the ￿rm.
Adjusting the issues for which the ￿rm lobbies appears to be relatively easy.
Table 7 provides a tabular summary of these e⁄ects. The left-hand columns
tabulate traits where we split ￿rms into ten groups based upon whether they
lobbied or not in the 2001-2003 period and based upon the strength of their
LCA demand. The latter is measured as quintiles based upon each ￿rm￿ s av-
erage LCA usage during the sample period. The right-hand columns provide a
similar decomposition using the ethnic patenting based dependency. Panel A
describes the observation count in each bin. By de￿nition, there are an equal
number of ￿rms in each dependency quintile, but the share of ￿rms that lobbied
during 2001-2003 is not restricted to be the same. Firms with the lowest de-
pendencies are fairly evenly split on whether or not they lobbied in 2001-2003,
while the share lobbying in 2001-2003 increases substantially in the highest de-
pendency bins. Panel B gives the average values of the dependency metric in
each bin. These dependencies increase as one moves down the quintile bins, and
the dependencies within each row are very similar between ￿rms that lobbied in
2001-2003 versus those that did not. This pattern is by construction and gives
a sense of the relative importance of the high-skilled immigration topic across
bins.
Panel C gives the share of ￿rms that lobby at least once during the 2001-
2003 period on high-skilled immigration issues. By de￿nition, these shares are
zero for the ￿rms that did not lobby at all during 2001-2003. Among those that
did lobby on at least one issue, the share lobbying on high-skilled immigration
is very small until it jumps to over 25% in the highest dependency quintile.
Panel D provides the share lobbying on high-skilled immigration in at least one
year during the 2004-2006 period after the cap becomes binding. The picture
18is striking: among ￿rms that did not lobby in 2001-2003, there is virtually no
entry into high-skilled immigration lobbying. On the other hand, some ￿rms
who lobbied during 2001-2003 on other issues start lobbying on high-skilled
immigration even though their dependency is very low. Looking back at Panel
B, this latter group has only 2%-3% of the dependency of the ￿rms in the highest
quintile who had not lobbied before and continued to not lobby (e.g., 4.2 vs.
127.6 and 2.4 vs. 103.5). The ￿nal set of rows con￿rm this. Panel E tabulates the
fraction of ￿rms who start lobbying for high-skilled immigration topics during
2004-2006; this share is calculated over the pool of ￿rms in each bin who did
not lobby on high-skilled immigration topics during 2001-2003. Looking down
the rows in Panel E, entry is closely tied to dependency; comparing the column
pairs, entry depends strongly on prior lobbying e⁄orts.26
This lack of a response along the extensive margin, along with the strong
intensive margin adjustments, demonstrates that barriers to entry played a sig-
ni￿cant role in shaping how ￿rms responded to these policy changes. If the costs
to beginning to lobby had not played a substantial role, we would have expected
signi￿cant adjustments along the intensive margin as well as the extensive mar-
gin for dependent ￿rms. This further suggests that these costs also play a large
role in shaping the responses of ￿rms to changes in the political environment.
While not our central focus, these results also shed light on a debate within
the political economy literature. Some authors have suggested that lobbyists
are specialists that focus primarily on a particular set of issues. An alternate
view is that lobbyists can in￿ uence a wide range of issues, within the constraints
of whom they know. Our results suggest that ￿rms can shift the set of issues
that they lobby for relatively easily. This provides suggestive evidence for the
￿ access￿hypothesis as opposed to the ￿ expertise￿hypothesis. These results are
consistent with the recent work of Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011)
and Blanes i Vidal, Dracaz, and Fons-Rosen (2011).
26The one ￿rm that began lobbying in 2004-2006 for high-skilled immigration that did not
lobby on any issue in 2001-2003 is Nike. Nike began lobbying in 2004 with ￿ve issues not
related to immigration (e.g., sports, trade). Nike began lobbying on high-skilled immigration
in 2005. There are no cases where a ￿rm lobbied for high-skilled immigration during 2001-2003
and stopped lobbying for the topic during 2004-2006.
Firms are not required to list the amount they spend for speci￿c topics. One measure of
intensity is the number of years that speci￿c topics are listed by ￿rms, and the patterns using
this metric provide a similar story. Of the ten ￿rms that lobbied on high-skilled immigration
topics during 2001-2003, only Motorola lobbied for the topic in more years during 2001-2003
than in 2004-2006 (three years vs. two years). Texas Instruments is the only ￿rm reporting
lobbying for high-skilled immigration in every year; eight ￿rms lobbied for high-skilled im-
migration in every year during 2004-2006. When looking among ￿rms that began lobbying
regarding high-skilled immigration in 2004-2006, the dependency level of ￿rms lobbying in all
three years is ten-fold higher than the dependency level of ￿rms that lobby for the topic in
one or two years.
196 Conclusions
While lobbying has been the subject of intense debate in the recent past, there is
little systematic empirical evidence on lobbying behavior at the ￿rm level. This
paper makes a contribution towards ￿lling this gap. In our panel of publicly-
traded, U.S.-headquartered ￿rms over the period 1998-2006, three stylized facts
emerge: (i) few ￿rms lobby, (ii) lobbying is strongly associated with ￿rm size,
and (iii) lobbying behavior exhibits a high degree of persistence. We develop a
dynamic model of ￿rm behavior to rationalize these ￿ndings, and show that the
existence of entry costs can explain all three ￿ndings. Our estimations of the
model ￿nd signi￿cant evidence for the existence of these costs across a number
of approaches. We test the predictions of the model using a natural experiment
in the area of immigration policy￿ the expiration of the increased cap on H-1B
visas that occurred in 2004. Using a panel data set of 171 major ￿rms over
2001-2006 with detailed information on lobbying activities, we ￿nd that ￿rms
dependent on high-skilled immigration adjusted their lobbying behavior towards
immigration-speci￿c issues in response to the shock. While the response was
very ￿ exible among ￿rms already lobbying, we do not ￿nd adjustments on the
extensive margin￿ i.e., ￿rms that were not lobbying on any issue prior to the
shock did not start lobbying in response to the shock.
These results support the existence of signi￿cant barriers to entry in the
process of lobbying. These costs can substantially limit the extensive margin
response by ￿rms to changes in policy environments. This rigidity due to entry
costs makes the set of ￿rms engaged in the lobbying process relatively stable for
many issues. These costs can thus in￿ uence the policy making process and the
choices made through the set of actors that lobby on issues. The composition of
￿rms that are advocating on a speci￿c issue are likely to be a non-representative
sample of business interests generally. As the high-skilled immigration case
illustrates, the group of lobbyists may not even include the voices of all of
the most in￿ uenced ￿rms if entry barriers are large enough. Moreover, both
￿rms and politicians will be able to reasonably forecast who will support or
oppose certain policies among those already engaged in the lobbying process.
This mechanism may induce persistence in political and economic institutions.
The limited changes in the set of ￿rms lobbying coupled with the long-term
relationships that ￿rms build with policy makers may also raise the prospects
of regulatory capture.
A better understanding of the role that ￿rms play in policy determination
through their lobbying e⁄orts is an essential research objective. Continuing with
the high-skilled immigration example, there are only a handful of studies that
consider the role of ￿rms in the immigration process or the consequences of
policy choices on those ￿rms. The size of this literature is somewhat surprising
given the fact that the H-1B program centers on a ￿rm-sponsored visa: the
￿rm identi￿es the worker it wishes to hire, applies for a visa on their behalf,
potentially applies for a green card on behalf of the worker, and generally has
a guaranteed period of time during which the worker is tied to the ￿rm. Not
20surprisingly, ￿rms attempt to de￿ne the rules of these procedures. Moreover,
they lobby extensively for the capacity to make as many of these hires as they
wish. Our understanding of high-skilled immigration policies requires an appre-
ciation of the ￿rm￿ s roles in policy determination. The same is certainly true,
if not more so, in other high pro￿le issues like government support to automo-
bile companies and airlines, the strength and scope of regulations on ￿nancial
services, and so on. The existence of entry costs to lobbying￿ and their impact
on ￿rm dynamics and the composition of ￿rms lobbying on policy issues￿ is an
important ingredient for future theoretical and empirical work in this vein.
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Fig. 1:  Entries, Exits, & Total Firms Lobbying 
Entries  Exits 
Total firms lobbying 
Notes: Figure plots total number of 
firms lobbying in each year as well as 
aggregate annual entries and exits 
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Fig. 2:  Aggregate Annual Expenditures  
by Entry Cohort 
Notes: Figure plots aggregate lobbying 
expenditures in millions of dollars for each 
cohort of entering firms, using the first year 
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Fig. 3:  Evolution of H-1B Visa Cap 
H-1B visa cap 
Notes:  Figure plots the cap on the number of H-1B 
visa that can be issued by fiscal year.  The cap was 
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Fig. 4:  Months to Reach H-1B Visa Cap 
Months to reach cap 
Notes:  Figure plots the 
number of months required 
from when the USCIS 
opens for applications until 
the H-1B cap is reached for 
the fiscal year. The cap 
was not reached in fiscal 
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Fig. 5:  H-1B Visas and Lobbying Behavior 
Total H-1B new visa 
issuances /  
H-1B numerical cap 
(left scale) 
 
Notes:  Lobbying for immigration intensifies 
as H-1B visas become harder to obtain.  
One measure of this difficulty is the total 
number of new visa issuances, which 
includes universities and non-profits that 
are not subject to the cap, divided by the 
numerical cap placed on issuances for for-
profit firms.  
Percentage of firms lobbying 
for immigration (right scale) 
Cap becomes binding again All Firms Non-Lobbying Firms Lobbying Firms
Annual Sales ($m) 1,823 1,423 5,407
(8,046) (7,179) (12,995)
Annual Employment (k) 8 7 23
(38) (37) (45)
Annual Assets ($m) 4,046 3,726 6,914
(30,732) (31,764) (18,896)
Share of Firms Engaging in R&D (%) 44 43 53
(50) (49) (50)
Annual R&D Expenditures ($m) 91 50 1,874
(462) (297) (8,245)
Median Lobbying Expenditures ($m) 0.164
Average Lobbying Expenditures ($m) 0.475
(0.892)
Share of Firms that Lobby in a Given Year (%) 6.2
Share of Firms that Ever Lobby (%) 10.0
Number of Firms 3,260 2,933 327
Observations 29,340 26,397 2,943
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Firm Panel
Notes:  The sample includes 3,260 firms over 1998-2006 for a total of 29,340 observations. Firm operations data are taken 
from Compustat. Annual R&D expenditures figures are only for firms that perform some R&D. Median and Average 
Lobbying Expenditures figures are similarly only for firms that lobby. Dollar amounts are in constant 1998 dollars. Standard 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(0,1) Lobbied Last Year 0.8848 0.8448 0.8846 0.8766 0.8810 0.4429 0.3385
(0.0432) (0.0376) (0.0442) (0.0427) (0.0434) (0.0232) (0.0279)
(0,1) Last Lobbied Two Years Ago 0.1557 0.0347
                                               (0.1565) (0.0458)
(0,1) Last Lobbied Three Years Ago 0.0693 0.0184
                                               (0.0773) (0.0478)
Log Sales 0.0071 0.0046 0.0031 0.0020 0.0034 0.0005 0.0000
                                               (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Log Employment 0.0144 -0.0042 -0.0010 0.0017 -0.0021 0.0016 0.0022
                                               (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Log R&D Expenditures 0.0065 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0003 0.0010 0.0003
                                               (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Log Industry Imports 0.0005 0.0002 0.0006 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 0.0003
(0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Log Lobbying by Other Firms in 0.0056
Industry (0.0024)
Notes:  Regressions estimate the determinants of lobbying participation by publicly-listed U.S. firms. Column 2 is our baseline approach using the Blundell-Bond 
(1998) Dynamic Panel Estimator. Firm-specific characteristics are lagged by one year to avoid issues of simultaneity. Industry x year fixed effects are defined at the 
two-digit level of the NAICS industry classification. Regressions include 26,080 observations from 3,260 firms, are unweighted, and cluster standard errors by firm. 
Columns 3 and 8 have 19,560 observations.





Blundell-Bond (1998) Dynamic Panel Estimator OLS with  
Firm and 
Year FE
Dependent Variable is an (0,1) Indicator Variable for Lobbying Participation by Firm
OLS with  
Firm and 
Year FEAll Firms
Firms Not Lobbying 
for High-Skilled 
Immigration Issues
Firms Lobbying for 
High-Skilled 
Immigration Issues
Annual Sales ($m) 14,680 11,561 32,073
(31,725) (25,555) (51,334)
Annual Employment (k) 44 38 77
(67) (64) (76)
Annual Assets ($m) 22,604 20,085 36,651
(65,144) (68,196) (41,899)
Annual R&D Expenditures ($m) 753 579 1,720
(1,431) (1,281) (1,798)
Annual Patent Count 236 152 704
(482) (222) (1,001)
Annual U.S. Domestic Patents by Chinese and Indian Inventors 43 24 151
(99) (40) (206)
Annual Labor Condition Application Count 94 49 345
(258) (80) (576)
Lobbying for Any Issue 62
Lobbying for Any Issue, at least one year 70
Lobbying for Immigration 10
Lobbying for Immigration, at least one year 20
Lobbying for High-Skilled Immigration 7
Lobbying for High-Skilled Immigration, at least one year 15
Average Annual Lobbying Expenditure ($m) 1.3
Median Annual Lobbying Expenditure ($m) 0.2
Immigration Visa Applications
Firm Operations
Notes:  The sample includes 171 U.S.-headquartered firms over 2001-2006 for a total of 1,026 observations. A list of these firms is in Appendix Table 2. We 
collect lobbying efforts from mandated lobbying reports filed with Congress biannually. Patent data are from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
We identify inventors of Chinese and Indian ethnicity through inventor names. Labor Condition Applications (LCA) are an initial step in the H-1B application 
process. We collect these LCA records from the Department of Labor. Firm operations data are taken from Compustat. Dollar amounts are in constant 1998 
dollars. Standard deviations are denoted in parentheses.
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for Firm Lobbying Panel on High-Skilled Immigration
Lobbying Efforts (% of Firms)
Patenting Efforts                                               (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Sales 0.039 0.022 0.011 0.019
(0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.024)
Log Employment -0.011 -0.008 -0.001 0.007
                                               (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026)
Log R&D Expenditures 0.028 -0.003 -0.005
                                               (0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Log Industry Imports -0.001 -0.006
                                               (0.002) (0.008)
Log US Chinese & Indian Patents 0.020 0.021
                                               (0.008) (0.009)
Log LCA Applications 0.031 0.025
                                               (0.013) (0.013)
Controls Basic Basic Basic Extended
(0,1) Indicator for High-Skilled Immigration Lobbying
Notes:  Estimations consider determinants of lobbying efforts over 2001-2006. Firm-specific characteristics are lagged 
by one year to avoid issues of simultaneity. Basic controls include year fixed effects. Extended controls further include 
industry-year fixed effects, controls for types of technologies patented, and controls for geographic regions of patenting 
activity. Regressions include 846 observations, are unweighted, and cluster standard errors by firm.
Table 4: Determinants of Lobbying for High-Skill Immigration Issues                                               (1) (2) (3) (4)
(0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x  0.043 -0.008
   Log Firm LCA Application Counts in 2001 (0.014) (0.009)
(0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x  0.029 -0.019
   Log Firm Chinese & Indian Patenting in 2001 (0.012) (0.014)
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:  See Table 4. Estimations consider entry into lobbying for immigration issues when the H-1B visa issuances cap became binding for 
the private sector. Firm dependencies are measured in 2001 and interacted with an indicator variable for sample years when the cap was 
reached (2004-2006). Main effects are absorbed into the firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Firm covariates include variables reported 
in Table 3 (e.g., lagged sales, lagged R&D expenditures, types of technologies patented, and geographic regions of patenting activity). 
Regressions include 846 observations, are unweighted, and cluster standard errors by firm.
Table 5: Entry into High-Skilled Immigration Lobbying with Binding H-1B Cap
(0,1) High-Skilled Immigration 
Lobbying
(0,1) Any Issue Lobbying                                               (1) (2) (3) (4)
(0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x  0.042 0.054
   Log Firm LCA Application Counts in 2001 (0.020) (0.021)
(0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x  0.030 0.025
   Log Firm Chinese & Indian Patenting in 2001 (0.019) (0.019)
(0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x  -0.013
   Log Firm LCA Application Counts in 2001 x (0.020)
   (0,1) Above Median Lobbying Firm
(0,1) Binding H-1B Issuances Cap x  0.008
   Log Firm Chinese & Indian Patenting in 2001 x (0.022)
   (0,1) Above Median Lobbying Firm
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimated Elasticity for Above Median Firm 0.042 0.033
(0.021) (0.022)
Table 6: Lobbying Adjustments among Persistent Lobbying Firms
Notes:  See Table 5. Sample is restricted to firms that lobby for at least one issue in every year, for 443 observations. 
(0,1) High-Skilled Immigration LobbyingFirms Not Firms Firms Not Firms
Lobbying  Lobbying  Lobbying  Lobbying 
on Any Issue on 1+ Issue on Any Issue on 1+ Issue
2001-2003 2001-2003 2001-2003 2001-2003
                                               (1) (2)                                                (3) (4)
A. Observation Count
  Least Dependent 114 96   Least Dependent 72 138
  2nd Quintile 78 126   2nd Quintile 108 96
  3rd Quintile 72 132   3rd Quintile 84 120
  4th Quintile 72 138   4th Quintile 72 132
  Most Dependent 24 174   Most Dependent 24 180
B. Average Dependency Measure
  Least Dependent 4.6 4.2   Least Dependent 2.2 2.4
  2nd Quintile 15.8 14.6   2nd Quintile 6.9 6.6
  3rd Quintile 26.6 29.9   3rd Quintile 12.5 13.8
  4th Quintile 62.1 66.7   4th Quintile 26.2 31.3
  Most Dependent 127.6 401.3   Most Dependent 103.5 172.4
C. Share Lobbying for High-Skilled Immigration Issues 2001-2003
  Least Dependent 0.00 0.00   Least Dependent 0.00 0.00
  2nd Quintile 0.00 0.00   2nd Quintile 0.00 0.00
  3rd Quintile 0.00 0.05   3rd Quintile 0.00 0.05
  4th Quintile 0.00 0.04   4th Quintile 0.00 0.05
  Most Dependent 0.00 0.28   Most Dependent 0.00 0.27
D. Share Lobbying for High-Skilled Immigration Issues 2004-2006
  Least Dependent 0.00 0.06   Least Dependent 0.00 0.13
  2nd Quintile 0.00 0.10   2nd Quintile 0.04 0.06
  3rd Quintile 0.00 0.14   3rd Quintile 0.00 0.05
  4th Quintile 0.08 0.22   4th Quintile 0.00 0.23
  Most Dependent 0.00 0.48   Most Dependent 0.00 0.50
E. Share Entering Lobbying for High-Skilled Immigration Issues Among Those Not Already Lobbying for the Issue
  Least Dependent 0.00 0.06   Least Dependent 0.00 0.13
  2nd Quintile 0.00 0.10   2nd Quintile 0.06 0.06
  3rd Quintile 0.00 0.10   3rd Quintile 0.00 0.00
  4th Quintile 0.08 0.18   4th Quintile 0.00 0.19
  Most Dependent 0.00 0.29   Most Dependent 0.00 0.32
Table 7: Lobbying Adjustments to High-Skilled Immigration across Distribution
Notes: Table summarizes lobbying dynamics regarding high-skilled immigration. Columns 1 and 2 tabulate traits where we split firms 
into ten groups based upon whether they lobbied or not in the 2001-2003 period and upon the strength of their LCA demand. The latter 
is measured as quintiles based upon each firm's average LCA usage during the sample period. Columns 3 and 4 provide a similar 
decomposition using the ethnic patenting dependency. Panel A provides the observation count in each bin. Panel B gives the average 
values of the dependency in each group. Panel C gives the share of firms that lobby at least once during the 2001-2003 period on high-
skilled immigration issues. Panel D provides the share lobbying on high-skilled immigration in at least one year during the 2004-2006 
period after the cap becomes binding. Panel E tabulates the share of firms who start lobbying for high-skilled immigration topics during 
2004-2006; this share is calculated over the pool of firms in each bin who did not lobby on high-skilled immigration topics during 2001-
2003. 
LCA-Based Dependency Ethnic Patenting-Based DependencyAppendix Figure 1:  Sample Lobbying Report for MicrosoftAppendix Figure 1:  Sample Lobbying Report for Microsoft, continued Accounting   Economics/Economic Development   Pharmacy 
 Advertising   Education   Postal 
 Aerospace   Energy/Nuclear   Railroads 
 Agriculture   Environmental/Superfund   Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation 
 Alcohol & Drug Abuse   Family Issues/Abortion/Adoption   Religion 
 Animals   Firearms/Guns/Ammunition   Retirement 
 Apparel/Clothing Industry/Textiles   Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities   Roads/Highway 
 Arts/Entertainment   Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc.)   Science/Technology 
 Automotive Industry   Foreign Relations   Small Business 
 Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines   Fuel/Gas/Oil   Sports/Athletics 
 Banking   Gaming/Gambling/Casino   Taxation/Internal Revenue Code 
 Bankruptcy   Government Issues   Telecommunications 
 Beverage Industry   Health Issues   Tobacco 
 Budget/Appropriations   Housing   Torts 
 Chemicals/Chemical Industry   Immigration   Trade (Domestic & Foreign) 
 Civil Rights/Civil Liberties   Indian/Native American Affairs   Transportation 
 Clean Air & Water (Quality)   Insurance   Travel/Tourism 
 Commodities (Big Ticket)   Labor Issues/Antitrust/Workplace   Trucking/Shipping 
 Communications/Broadcasting/Radio/TV   Law Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice   Urban Development/Municipalities 
 Computer Industry   Manufacturing   Unemployment 
 Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection   Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries   Utilities 
 Constitution   Media (Information/Publishing)   Veterans 
 Copyright/Patent/Trademark   Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs   Waste (Hazardous/Solid/Interstate/Nuclear) 
 Defense   Medicare/Medicaid   Welfare 
 District of Columbia   Minting/Money/Gold Standard 
 Disaster Planning/Emergencies   Natural Resources 
Appendix Table 1: List of Lobbying Issues
Source: Senate’s Office of Public Records (SOPR).Abbott Laboratories Caliper Technologies  General Motors Corporation
ADC Telecommunications Callaway Golf Company General Signal
Adtran Inc Caterpillar Inc Gentex Corporation
Affymetrix Inc Ciena Corporation Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
Agere Systems Cirrus Logic Inc Halliburton Company
Agilent Technologies Cisco Systems Inc Harman International Industries Inc
Air Products and Chemicals Inc CNH America Harris Corporation
Alcoa Inc Colgate-Palmolive Company Hill-Rom Services Inc
Align Technology Inc Conexant Systems Inc Honeywell International
Allergan Inc Corning Inc Hewlett Packard-Compaq
Altera Corporation Cypress Semiconductor Hubbell Inc
Advanced Micro Devices Dana Corporation Human Genome Sciences Inc
American Express Deere and Company IBM Corporation
Amgen Inc Dell IGT
Amkor Technology Delphi Corporation Illinois Tool Works Inc
Analog Devices Inc Digimarc Corporation Imation Corporation
Andrew Corporation Dow Chemical Company Incyte
Apple Computer Inc Du Pont Integrated Device Technology Inc
Applied Materials Inc Eastman Chemical Company Intel Corporation
Arvin Meritor Technology Eastman Kodak Company Interdigital Technology Corporation
Advanced Technology Materials Eaton Corporation Intersil Americas Inc
Avery Dennison Corporation Ecolab Inc International Rectifier Corporation
Baker Hughes Inc Eli Lilly and Company Invitrogen Corporation
Baxter International Emerson Electric Company Isis Pharmaceuticals
BEA Systems Exxon Mobil ITT Manufacturing Enterprises Inc
Becton, Dickinson and Company Fairchild Semiconductor  Johnson & Johnson
Black and Decker Inc Federal Mogul Worldwide JDS Uniphase Corporation
Boeing Company Finisar Corporation Kimberly Clark Worldwide Inc
Borg Warner Inc First Data Corporation KLA-Tencor Technologies Corporation
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Ford Motor Company Lam Research Corporation
Broadcom Corporation FormFactor Inc Lattice Semiconductor Corporation
Brocade Communications Systems Garmin Limited Lear Corporation
Brunswick Corporation Gateway Inc Lexmark International Inc
Cabot Microelectronics  General Electric Company Lincoln Global Inc
Cadence Design Systems Inc Genentech Inc Lockheed Martin Corporation
Appendix Table 2: List of Firms in SampleLSI Logic Corporation Schlumberger Technology
Masco Corporation Seagate Technology Inc
Mattel Inc Semitool Inc
Medtronic Inc Sepracor Inc
Merck and Company Shuffle Master Inc
Micron Technology Silicon Laboratories
Microsoft Corporation Skyworks Solutions Inc
Millennium Pharmaceuticals  Sonoco
Molex Inc Sprint-Nextel
Motorola Inc Steris Inc
National Instruments  St Jude Medical
National Semiconductor  Sun Microsystems Inc
NCR Corporation Symyx Technologies
Nike Inc Synopsys Inc
Nordson Corporation Tektronix Inc
Novellus Systems Inc Tessera Inc
Nvidia Corporation Texas Instruments Inc
ON Semiconductor 3Com
Oracle Corporation 3M
Parker-Hannifin  Tyco Electronics Corporation
Pfizer Inc Unisys Corporation
Altria Group United Technologies Corporation
Pitney Bowes Inc United Parcel Service
Playtex Producs Inc Visteon
PPG Industries Weatherford International
Praxair S T Technology Inc Western Digital Corporation
Proctor and Gamble Company Weyerhaeuser Company
Qualcomm Inc Whirlpool Corporation
Qwest Communications International Inc Wolverine Worldwide Inc
Rambus Inc Wyeth
Raytheon Company Xerox Corporation
Rockwell Automation Technologies Xilinx Inc
Rohm and Haas Company Zymogenetics Inc
Appendix Table 2: List of Firms in Sample, ContinuedBaseline: 
Blundell-Bond 
(1998) Model 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1) Lobbied Last Year 0.8848 0.5245 0.8837 0.8749 0.8823
(0.0432) (0.1816) (0.0438) (0.0416) (0.0488)
Log Sales 0.0046 0.0026 0.0037 0.0035 0.0046
                                               (0.0021) (0.0045) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Log Employment -0.0042 -0.0098 -0.0027 -0.0012 -0.0076
                                               (0.0038) (0.0168) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0049)
Log R&D Expenditure 0.0004 -0.0030 0.0004 -0.0012 0.0021
                                               (0.0009) (0.0094) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Log Industry Imports 0.0002 -0.0018 0.0005 -0.0018 -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0006)
Within-Industry Employment Rank (*100) -0.0014
(0.0028)
Log Lobbying by Other Firms in 0.0079
Industry (0.0038)
Notes:  See Table 2.
Appendix Table 3: Determinants of Lobbying Status
 (0,1) Indicator Variable for Lobbying Participation by Firm